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Chapter 11
Comparing Spending Approaches
in Retirement
John Ameriks, Michael Hess, and Liqian Ren
The retirement income challenge – the question of how to optimally
generate a sustainable and reliable stream of income in retirement – is
one of the biggest unresolved issues facing investors and financial services
organizations around the world. The continued confusion, consternation,
and debate about the optimal solution for retirement is perhaps surprising,
given that solving multi-period consumption and portfolio choice pro-
blems under uncertainty is not new to the economics literature. Formal
solutions to such problems have been a part of that literature since at least
the late 1960s. Yet in both the academic literature and in practice, there is
wide variation in solution techniques – both products and methods – used
by investors and recommended by advisors and experts. In the academic
literature, differences in solutions tend to be driven by differences in
assumptions about investor preferences, constraints, costs, and the degree
and nature of modeled uncertainty. In practice, solutions may differ for all
of the above reasons, plus a host of others, including social conventions,
force of habit, or other behavioral or institutional factors.
In this chapter, we take an agnostic, practical look at simulated financial
outcomes resulting from the use of different common ‘product’ or ‘draw-
down strategy’ choices in retirement. Unlike much of the academic litera-
ture aimed at comparing retirement income strategies, we do not impose a
specific functional form on investor preferences and solve a formal optimi-
zation problem; rather we focus on the simulated impact of the chosen
strategy on several summary statistics describing various aspects of invest-
ment outcomes that real-world retirees seem to care about. There are many
merits to formal optimization, but many retirees and practitioners have
little notion of the implications of various functional forms for retirement
decision-making. In addition, they may have difficulty interpreting or
determining whether a summary measure such as a utility metric is, in
fact, a good representation of their clients or constituents preferences
over various outcomes.
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Simulations reveal that these alternative retirement income strategies
can produce widely different outcomes in terms of each of the statistics
that we measure. Each of these strategies is currently advocated and em-
ployed by some group striving to serve the needs of retirees. We interpret
this evidence to suggest that future research would benefit by a better
understanding and more complete specification of retirees’ various needs
and objectives. In our view, very productive insights can be derived by
building more robust models of retiree preferences that explicitly incorpo-
rate the various motivations that appear relevant.
We begin by reviewing some of the previous studies on this topic. We
then describe the strategies/products on which we focus and detail the
evaluation methodology. Finally, we present and discuss results.
A brief review of prior studies on retirement payouts
Discussion of optimal spend-down in retirement often begins with a focus
on payout life annuities. In a standard economic model of risk-averse savers
who value only their own lifetime consumption, immediate life annuities
can have significant insurance value (Yaari 1965). Economists have subse-
quently shown that at least partial annuitization may add value even when
many restrictive assumptions of the simplified modeling framework are
relaxed (Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond 2005; Horneff et al. 2010); even
when full annuitization is not indicated, partial annuitization is still gener-
ally a part of the optimal spending strategy.
Yet, in practice, investors have been reluctant to adopt annuities and
researchers continue to struggle to explain this so-called annuity puzzle.
One reason may be that investors typically lose control of annuitized assets,
as for all practical purposes, annuitization is irreversible. Such lack of liquid-
ity can be important, if unexpected expenditure shocks such as uninsured
medical expenses occur (Sinclair and Smetters 2004; Turra and Mitchell
2008; Ameriks et al. 2009). In addition, in the current environment, many
financial services organizations have been forced to turn to taxpayers for
financial support, so it is also possible that individuals view as unacceptably
high the potential costs of a default by their annuity provider. Another
reason, noted by Dushi and Webb (2004) and Mitchell et al. (1999) is the
existence of other annuitized resources such as Social Security or employer-
sponsored pensions, which could explain why investors may be reluctant to
voluntarily annuitize. A further headwind for annuitization is retirees’ be-
quest motives. In theUnited States, for instance, over half of the elderly plan
say they intend to leave a bequest of more than $10,000 (Bernheim 1991;
Hurd and Smith 1999). On the other hand, Brown (2001) finds that the
bequest motive is not significant in the annuitization decision.
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Yet another reason investors may avoid annuitization is that purchasing a
traditional fixed annuity with a significant sum of assets precludes investing
those assets in equity markets with their historically risk premium over
other investments. Of course, variable immediate life annuities (sold in
the United States by many insurers) do offer investors the ability to partici-
pate in equity market returns while still offering the advantages of higher
expected returns via pooled mortality risk as well as the hedge for risk-
averse investors who worry about exhausting their assets. Blake, Cairns,
and Dowd (2003) show that equity-linked variable annuities should appeal
to many investors compared to either a phased withdrawal plan or a fixed
payout annuity. Brown and Poterba (2000) demonstrate that equity-linked
variable annuities can generate greater utility than fixed annuities for a
broad range of risk aversion parameters. While both of these studies
take an all-or-nothing approach, Horneff et al. (2010) show that variable
annuities can (modestly) enhance an investor’s portfolio, particularly if
variable annuities can be purchased gradually in retirement allowing both
annuities and financial wealth to be held simultaneously. It is perhaps an
additional annuity puzzle that immediate variable annuity sales are far
below those of standard fixed annuities.
Thus, despite the theory, many real-world investors avoid annuities in
favor of holding and managing a portfolio of unannuitized investments.
Then their task is to determine a level of ‘sustainable’ withdrawals during
the retirement period (cf. Bengen 1994; Pye 2000).1 This literature offers
a wide range of results, though most propose a broadly diversified invest-
ment portfolio of stocks and bonds, together with a ‘drawdown rule’
amounting to constant inflation-adjusted withdrawals equal to 4–5 percent
of the investor’s account balance at retirement (taken annually until
death or the exhaustion of the retirement portfolio). Such withdrawal
strategies may offer some benefits to an investor versus an annuity product,
but they also expose the retiree to the risk of running out of money or
having to cut consumption substantially.
Another thread in the payouts literature highlights the importance of so-
called default arrangements for individual investors (Beshears et al. 2008).
Two types of defaults are especially relevant. One type has to do with what is
defined as the ‘normal’ or typical form of benefits provided in defined
benefit (DB) plans. It is interesting that these seem to have relatively little
effect. Thus, when plan participants in two large pension plans were given
choice between an annuity benefit or a lump-sum benefit, very large
majorities elected to receive their benefits in the form of a lump sum –
despite the fact that the annuity was the normal form or default choice for
those benefits (Mottola and Utkus 2007). A second type pertains to the
government’s rule specifying required minimum distributions (RMDs)
that older investors must take from their traditional individual retirement
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accounts (IRAs) and 401(k)/403(b) retirement plans in order to avoid tax
penalties. It appears, based on one large retirement plan provider, that
distributions taken according to RMD rules are a large and fast-growing
distribution choice of recent retirees (Ameriks 2004). In addition, these
rules are cited as the most common reason that retirees offer for with-
drawing assets from their IRAs (Holden 2009). In other words, default
options may play a role in shaping retirement withdrawal patterns, but
more remains to be explored on the topic.
Spending/income models examined
In the last 5 years, deferred variable annuity contracts have become increas-
ingly popular, particularly those that provide so-called living benefits.
These usually include a complex combination of guarantees that can
incorporate elements of put options on investment returns and deferred
life annuities. In this section, we focus on eight spending/income-generat-
ing methods we will model and evaluate, including plans that incorporate a
specific type of guarantee, namely guaranteed lifetime withdrawal benefits
(GLWB). These refer to an annuity that some industry observers argue has
the potential to become the ‘product of choice’ for retirees (see Ibbotson
Associates 2007).2 The eight methods we evaluate include payout funds
(endowment-style funds and time-horizon-style funds), balanced mutual
fund with fixed real withdrawals, fixed real (inflation-adjusted) immediate
annuities, immediate variable annuities (IVA), variable deferred annuities
with GLWB, RMDs, half fixed real annuity/half RMD, and half variable
immediate annuity /half RMD. We describe each of these methods in
detail next.
Payout funds
In the broadest terms, payout funds are pooled investment funds (typically
mutual funds) coupled with a specific mechanism for the provision of
periodic payments to fund investors. Payout funds are currently offered
as daily-valuation mutual funds and can therefore provide investors the
same type of daily liquidity as any mutual fund. A net asset value (NAV) for
the shares of these funds is struck every trading day, and investors can elect
to purchase or sell shares of these funds at that price on that day. Payout
funds do not guarantee either a level of payments or returns, but provide
either targeted or formulaically determined periodic distributions of fund
assets to fund shareholders in combination with a professionally managed
investment portfolio. A brief but fairly accurate description of payout funds
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is that they amount to a prepackaged combination of a specific systematic
withdrawal strategy with a mutual fund investment. In fact, a common
criticism of the funds is that they ‘don’t do anything that a motivated
investor couldn’t do for himself.’ This description is also fairly accurate –
but of course the key question is whether investors view a prepackaged
combination as being a cost-effective or value-added means of implement-
ing a distribution strategy relative to doing so themselves.
In some cases, the payout mechanism bundled with the payout fund is
literally implemented as a systematic withdrawal program that a fund
investor must proactively enroll in to receive distributions from the ‘pay-
out fund.’ This design would appear to enable payout rules to differ for
different investors in the same fund. But at the time of this writing, no
payout funds are implementing distribution schedules rules that rely
upon investor-specific data. In other designs, the payouts are made
through the fund accounting process of the payout fund itself, and are
made to shareholders as periodic distributions per fund share (requiring
all shares to be treated equally, and hence all shareholders holding the
same number of shares to be treated equally). In this design, distributions
are declared and delivered to shareholders in a manner similar to that
used to declare and deliver periodic distributions of income, dividends,
and capital gains to shareholders. An important aspect of payout funds
with this design is that to meet the targeted or formulaically determined
distribution amounts, some of the periodic fund distributions may be a
return of capital to the investor, and hence not interest income, dividends,
or realized gains.
The investment management strategies and asset allocation employed in
these funds vary across providers, with different providers using different
asset allocations, and emphasizing active management, passive manage-
ment, or the use of alternatives as a part of the underlying investment
strategy for the funds. Some providers use only ‘traditional’ asset classes
(long-only stocks, bonds, and cash-like investments), while others are in-
cluding or at least envisioning the use of alternatives such as long–short
strategies, commodities, futures, and other types of investments.
Payout mutual funds first became available to investors beginning in
2006, and as of this writing there were at least six financial services
organizations offering some type of payout fund (Baron Funds, Charles
Schwab & Co., Fidelity Investments, John Hancock, Russell Investment
Company, and Vanguard).3 The specific design and objectives of payout
funds are not uniform across providers. While designs continue to evolve,
two basic designs or flavors of these funds appear to have emerged (de-
scribed later), and we will focus on these two basic outlines in what
follows.4
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ENDOWMENT-STYLE PAYOUT FUNDS
Endowment-style payout funds are designed to provide periodic distribu-
tions/payments to fund shareholders on an ongoing basis, and are not
tied to a specific investor’s age or life expectancy. As with all payout funds,
there are no guarantees, and the size of periodic payments can vary as a
consequence of investment returns, formulaic adjustments to the periodic
payments, the impact of fund expenses, or the provider altering the
specified distribution policy. The payout rules or strategies adopted by
these funds are nevertheless designed with the goal of providing some
payments to shareholders indefinitely.
As mentioned, specific payout mechanisms and the levels of payout
available in payout funds vary among providers. In this analysis, we focus
on a hypothetical payout fund that distributes payments to shareholders on
a quarterly basis. In the simulations to follow, these quarterly payments are
set once a year equal to 5 percent of the 12-quarter trailing historical
average of the net value of the investment in the fund. There is at least
one provider that in practice uses a distribution rule very close to this.
TIME-HORIZON PAYOUTS FUNDS
Instead of being managed to produce payments in perpetuity, time-hori-
zon funds are designed to provide a sequence of formulaically determined
payouts over a set period (e.g., 10, 20, or 30 years), fully exhausting invested
amounts at the end of that period. There are no investment or payment
guarantees; periodic payments may vary due to investment returns, pay-
ment adjustments, fund expenses, or to the provider altering the specified
distribution policy.
In what follows, we model a time-horizon fund with a 30-year distribution
period. The initial target payout rate will be approximately 5 percent, and
payments will be distributed on a quarterly basis. Each year, the target
payout rate changes (according to the schedule shown in Table 11A.1),
and the quarterly distribution amounts are recalculated.
Systematic distributions from a balanced mutual fund
In addition to the payout funds, we also examine a strategy based on fixed
inflation-adjusted withdrawals from a typical balanced mutual fund. De-
spite the popularity of this kind of drawdown rule in financial planning
circles and in the popular press (cf. Updegrave 2007), we are not aware of
any fund company that currently offers a service that will automatically
compute and implement inflation-adjusted annual withdrawals as a distri-
bution option on a standard mutual fund. Most companies will allow a
shareholder to specify a dollar or percentage amount to distribute from the
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fund on a periodic basis, but the fund investor must then compute the
required inflation adjustment to the payments each year and then submit
those revised instructions to the fund provider.
In our modeling, we assume the shareholder withdraws an amount equal
to 5 percent of initial wealth at the time of investment, with distributions
paid on a quarterly basis. Each year, these payments will be adjusted to
reflect the previous year’s change in inflation.
Fixed lifetime income annuity
Income annuities are a form of insurance intended to address the uncer-
tainty investors face when planning for income for the rest of their lives. In
exchange for permanently surrendering access to a portion of their assets,
annuitants receive a stream of income as long as they live. Fixed income
annuities are different from the first three approaches discussed, in that
the annuity provider guarantees that the investors will receive a specific
level of income as long as they live. This guarantee removes the uncertainty
of longevity risk and the possibility of exhausting assets later in life, but it
also introduces some additional costs and risks. The costs include poten-
tially high insurance fees; risks include the loss of liquidity, the possibility of
leaving a diminished estate, and the possible failure of the guarantee
provider.5
In what follows, we model a fixed single-life annuity that adjusts annually
for inflation. We assume the investor is a 65-year-old male, and the initial
payout amount is based upon an actual January 30, 2009 insurance quote
from Vanguard.com. Annuity payments are assumed to be made quarterly,
and adjustments to the payout amount be conducted annually based on the
change in the consumer price index.
Variable immediate annuity
Similar to fixed income annuities, variable annuities deliver guaranteed
income for life, but the income amount is not fixed, instead being subject
to the investment performance of the underlying funds relative to the
assumed interest rate (AIR). The guarantee of variable income for life
introduces many of the same costs and risks as those associated with fixed
annuities, plus the additional risk that investment returns will be poor and
diminish the value of ongoing payments. When investing in a variable
annuity, investors have the opportunity to choose the structure of the
underlying investments, and, as mentioned, the distribution amount for a
variable annuity is subject to the performance of the underlying funds in
relation to the AIR (which the investor also chooses). This gives investors
the ability to benefit (via increased payouts) from market returns when
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times are good, but when market returns are poor, decreased payout
amounts are a possibility. In other words, the payout stream will rise if the
underlying fund performance is higher than the AIR, and it will fall if
the underlying fund performance is lower than the AIR.
In our analysis, we focus on a 65-year-old male investor who purchases a
variable annuity with an AIR of 3.5 percent. The initial payout amount is
based upon a January 30, 2009, quote from Vanguard.com, and distribu-
tions are made on a quarterly basis. Payments are adjusted on a quarterly
basis and calculated based on the underlying fund performance relative to
the AIR.
Variable annuities with GLWB
A relatively new innovation in variable annuity products is the GLWB rider
that can be added to a deferred variable annuity contract.
Two features of a variable annuity with GLWB set it apart from traditional
variable annuities. First, the GLWB rider gives investors the ability to protect
their retirement income from market declines while still having the oppor-
tunity to profit when themarket increases. This is a form of a ‘put option,’ at
least with regard to the level of income that can be generated from the
investment in the contract. Mechanically, the insurer establishes a ‘guaran-
teed income base’ for the contract that is equal to the initial deposit
(premium) on the contract. This guaranteed income base cannot decrease
as long as withdrawals from the contract are no more than the guaranteed
minimum amount. The guaranteed income base can ‘step up’ on the rider
anniversary date should themarkets perform well and the remaining invest-
ment value in the contract exceed the amount of the initial deposit. The
guaranteed income base cannot decline as a result of investment perfor-
mance. The guaranteed minimum level of withdrawals are expressed as a
set fraction of this guaranteed withdrawal base, which the provider guaran-
tees will not decrease (but could increase) over the life of the contract.
A second feature of the GLWB rider is that any remaining investment
value in the contract (the initial investment, plus returns and any
subsequent investments, minus costs and any guaranteed or other with-
drawals) can be withdrawn at any time or bequeathed at death, cancelling
the contract at that point. Withdrawals in excess of the guaranteed mini-
mum amount can also be taken at any time but reduce the guaranteed
income base in the same proportion as such withdrawals reduce the re-
maining investment value in the contract (potentially to zero if 100 percent
of the investment value is withdrawn).
When we consider the 65-year-old male investor, we assume the GLWB
rider offers this investor the ability to withdraw 5 percent of the guaranteed
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/7/2010, SPi
Retirement Spending Approaches 205
income base each year, with distributions being made on a quarterly basis.
Each year on the rider anniversary date, the guaranteed income base will be
reevaluated based on the net performance of the underlying funds, after
the withdrawals and annual rider fees have been deducted. If the invest-
ment value in the contract at that point exceeds the guaranteed income
base, it will be ‘stepped up’ from that point forward. We also assume that
the investor holds a fixed portfolio allocation throughout retirement,
although there has been some evidence that the options embedded in
this type of variable annuity structure may impact portfolio allocation
(Milevsky and Kyrychenko 2008).
RMD withdrawal plan
We also simulate the results that an investor would achieve by taking
distributions from their retirement assets in accordance with the RMD
rules published by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). These rules estab-
lish an amount of income that must be distributed (in order to avoid tax
penalties) to investors each year, beginning the year after the account
owner turns age 70.5. Distribution amounts are a specified proportion of
the account that varies with investor age according to IRS tables (listed in
Table 11A.1). We also simulate and evaluate two strategies that are a
combination of the RMDs rules with the use of fixed real and variable
immediate annuities.
Summary of assumptions
Our goal is to focus on the real-world difference in simulated outcomes
for retirees pursuing each of these different drawdown strategies. To do so,
several additional assumptions are needed regarding investment alloca-
tions and fee levels for the strategies described, summarized in Table 11.1.
While these are subjective, we believe they are a reasonable reflection of
‘standard,’ ‘typical,’ or ‘average’ investment allocations and fee levels for
the products and strategies of interest.
In all cases, to generate asset returns, we use 10,000 simulations of 30-
year sequences of assets returns and inflation rates, using a proprietary
capital markets simulation engine created and used at Vanguard to simu-
late asset returns. This model is based on the estimation and simulation of a
vector auto-regression model of monthly asset returns, inflation, interest
rates, and other economic factors based on data from 1960 through 2008.
Additional details on the model can be found in Davis, Wallick, and Aliaga-
Diaz (2009); summary statics describing the simulation output and the
asset classes we focus on are shown in Table 11.2.
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Results and discussion
We display results in three ways, reporting statistics related to the levels of
periodic cash flows provided by the strategies, statistics related to the
evolution of remaining wealth over the lifetime of the retiree, and data
on the internal rates of return (IRRs) of the simulated strategies at differ-
ent horizons.
Cash flows generated by the strategies
Table 11.3 illustrates the average level and a volatility metric for real cash
flows from each of these strategies, for investment horizons of 5, 20, and 30
years after retirement (the volatility metric is a ratio of the mean level of
income to the lower semi-variance of income across all simulations; higher
is better). The eight different drawdown options are organized in descend-
ing order of the median level of simulated cash flow at the 20-year horizon.
Results show that, in terms of providing stable real cash flow measured by
the ratio of mean cash flow to lower semi-variance, the real annuity and the
constant inflation-adjusted withdrawals from a balanced mutual fund ap-
pear significantly more attractive than other options.
Figures 11.1 and 11.2 present some summary statistics on volatility in cash
flows over the entire 30-year horizon. Figure 11.1 shows the fraction of
quarters in which the nominal distributions from the strategy are more than
5 percent lower than in a year earlier. The columns are sorted in decreasing
order, fromhighest (most volatile) to lowest, illustrating the relative downside
volatility of the IVA, RMDs, time-horizon payout funds, and the IVA/RMD
Table 11.2 Summary of asset simulations over 30-year horizon
Median annualized
return (%)
Median standard
deviation (%)
US equity 9.3 19.1
International equity 10.6 21.8
Nominal fixed income 5.0 6.7
Commodities 6.1 14.6
Market neutral 3.7 6.4
Notes: US equities represented by the MSCI US Broad Market Index; international equities by
the MSCI EAFE + EM Index; the broad taxable bond market by Barclays Capital US Aggregate
Bond Index; commodity futures by the Dow Jones-AIG Commodity Index; and the market-
neutral by the Citigroup 3-Month Treasury Bill Index.
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/7/2010, SPi
208 John Ameriks, Michael Hess, and Liqian Ren
combination. The GLWB is at the opposite extreme with no nominal down-
side volatility, with other strategies in the middle range. Figure 11.2 presents
data on median real annualized growth rates of the distributions of income
fromeach of the strategies, again in decreasing order, showing at themedian,
RMDs/annuity combinations produce the highest growth in payments, while
balanced funds, real annuities, endowment-style payout funds, and the vari-
able annuities with GLWB produce the least average/typical growth.
Table 11.4 shows data on the median balances remaining at three differ-
ent points in the horizon for investors, and the level of cross-sectional
volatility. Here, the time-horizon payout funds have a slightly higher
mean-to-semi-variance, with several other strategies following close behind.
Yet the relative performance of the various strategies varies widely by time
Table 11.3 Total real cash flow excluding ending balance
5 years 20 years 30 years
Strategy Median
($)
Mean/
volatilitya
Median
($)
Mean/
volatilitya
Median
($)
Mean/
volatilitya
Real fixed
annuity
0.34 234.1 1.35 183.8 2.03 207.6
Balanced mutual
fund
0.25 234.1 0.98 15.0 1.47 4.3
50% in real fixed
annuity/50% in
RMD
0.17 234.1 1.15 8.2 1.96 5.7
Variable annuity
with GLWB
0.25 18.0 0.97 5.8 1.40 4.4
Time-horizon
payout funds
0.26 10.7 1.11 4.5 1.77 3.7
Variable annuity
with 3.5% AIR
0.37 9.9 1.58 4.4 2.47 3.5
50% in variable
annuity with
3.5% AIR/50%
in RMD
0.19 9.9 1.26 4.0 2.18 3.2
Required
minimum
distribution
0.00 0.0 0.94 3.5 1.89 2.9
Endowment-style
payout funds
0.24 13.7 0.95 4.2 1.42 3.3
aMeasured as mean total real cash flow across all simulations divided by the lower semi-variance
of the mean total real cash flow across all simulations; higher is better.
Note: See Table 11.1 for definitions.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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horizon, with perhaps the exception of the endowment-style payout funds
that have a median residual balance that is similar at all horizons.
Figure 11.3 presents data on the typical volatility (measured as standard
deviation) of the remaining asset balance available to the retiree. The
greatest volatility in balance is generated by the time-horizon payout
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Figure 11.1 Percentage of quarters with 5 percent or more loss in year-over-year
cash flow over 30-year horizon (nominal), by type of holding. Note: See Table 11.1
for definitions. Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Figure 11.2 Median annualized growth of cash flow over 30-year horizon (real), by
type of holding. Note: See Table 11.1 for definitions. Source: Authors’ calculations;
see text.
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funds. All of the investment-related solutions have very similar volatility
levels, while the annuity solutions (trivially) have no volatility, as there is no
remaining balance.
Finally, Table 11.5 presents summary data on the real IRRs at different
horizons for each of the strategies. The data show that as investor horizons
lengthen or shorten, the implications for differences in relative IRRs across
the strategies can change quite dramatically. Of course, the starkest exam-
ples are the immediate annuities, which produce the worst relative results
at short horizons, but the best results at the long horizons. Most of the
investment-related strategies produce similar IRRs across the different
implementations and product designs, largely a result of the fact that the
investment allocations are quite similar across the various products.
Table 11.4 Median ending portfolio balance (real)
5 years 20 years 30 years
Strategy Median
($)
Mean/
volatilitya
Median
($)
Mean/
volatilitya
Median
($)
Mean/
volatilitya
Time-horizon
payout funds
0.95 5.1 0.56 2.7 0.00 0.0
Required
minimum
distribution
1.26 5.3 1.25 2.5 0.84 2.1
50% in variable
annuity with
3.5% AIR/50%
in RMD
0.63 5.3 0.62 2.5 0.42 2.1
50% in real fixed
annuity/50% in
RMD
0.63 5.3 0.62 2.5 0.42 2.1
Endowment-style
payout funds
1.00 4.3 0.96 2.2 0.94 1.9
Variable annuity
with GLWB
0.94 4.9 0.71 2.0 0.52 1.5
Balanced mutual
fund
0.98 4.7 0.89 1.7 0.77 1.3
Variable annuity
with 3.5% AIR
0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0
Real fixed
annuity
0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0
aMeasured as mean total real cash flow across all simulations divided by the lower semi-variance
of the mean total real cash flow across all simulations; higher is better.
Note: See Table 11.1 for definitions.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/7/2010, SPi
Retirement Spending Approaches 211
Conclusion
This simulation exercise shows that different commonly advocated retire-
ment income strategies produce a wide variety of possible outcomes.
Some of the largest differences in outcomes are related to the impact of
the various drawdown strategies and products on the residual/bequeathable
wealth levels. Annuity options obviously provide relative stability of income
flows but have strong negative impacts on residual wealth early in retire-
ment. Drawdown strategies lack the pooling of mortality risk provided
by the annuity so are less effective at providing stable income over very
long horizons, but they tend to offer enhanced residual value of retirement
assets upon death at shorter horizons. Insurance guarantees such as the
GLWB rider can introduce very limited levels of annuitization that can have
some value in the worst states, combining some of the features of drawdown
with annuitization.
All of the approaches analyzed are useful to some degree in achieving the
objective of providing a source of periodic payments. In addition, it is clear
from the simulation analysis that none of the proposed strategies is domi-
nated by any of the others if one admits the possibility that residual wealth
levels are of great importance to retirees. The reluctance of retirees to
voluntarily annuitize assets is strong evidence that maintaining full control
over and possession of their assets is of significant value to many retirees.
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Figure 11.3 Median standard deviation of quarter-over-quarter change of balance
over 30-year horizon, by type of holding. Note : See Table 11.1 for definitions. Source :
Authors’ calculations; see text.
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All of these approaches are currently in use in the retirement market-
place. A follow-up question that arises is what specifications of retiree
preferences or desires might help explain why individuals appear to em-
brace investment strategies and solutions that emphasize continued growth
of residual assets.
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Table 11.5 Median annual internal rates of return (real) for various holding
periods
5 years 20 years 30 years
Strategy Median
(%)
Mean/
volatilitya
Median
(%)
Mean/
volatilitya
Median
(%)
Mean/
volatilitya
Real fixed annuity 30.4 286.0 3.2 55.0 5.5 134.3
50% in real fixed
annuity/50% in
RMD
4.9 1.4 4.3 2.6 5.1 4.1
50% in variable
annuity with 3.5%
AIR/50% in RMD
4.5 1.1 4.9 1.8 5.8 2.4
Required
minimum
distribution
4.7 1.1 4.8 1.8 4.9 2.1
Variable annuity
with 3.5% AIR
28.2 9.5 4.9 1.7 7.1 2.8
Time-horizon
payout funds
4.2 1.0 4.1 1.7 4.0 1.8
Balanced mutual
fund
4.6 1.1 4.6 1.6 4.6 1.6
Endowment-style
payout funds
4.9 0.9 4.8 1.6 4.8 1.9
Variable annuity
with GLWB
3.8 0.9 4.0 1.5 4.0 1.8
a Measured as mean IRR across all simulations divided by the lower semi-variance of the mean
IRR across all simulations; higher is better.
Note: See Table 11.1 for definitions.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Appendix 11A Glide Path for Asset Allocation
Table 11A.1 Payout rates and asset allocation patterns by age
Time-horizon fund asset
allocation
Age Year Requiredminimum
distribution (RMD)
payout rate (%)
Time-horizon
fund payout
rate (%)
US
equities
(%)
International
equities (%)
Bonds
(%)
65 1 0.0 5.09 50.3 12.2 37.5
66 2 0.0 5.18 49.5 11.9 38.7
67 3 0.0 5.27 48.6 11.6 39.8
68 4 0.0 5.38 48.0 11.1 41.0
69 5 0.0 5.50 47.3 10.6 42.1
70 6 3.6 5.63 46.8 10.1 43.2
71 7 3.8 5.77 46.2 9.6 44.2
72 8 3.9 5.93 45.9 9.3 44.9
73 9 4.0 6.10 45.5 8.9 45.6
74 10 4.2 6.30 45.2 8.5 46.4
75 11 4.4 6.50 44.8 8.0 47.2
76 12 4.5 6.75 44.4 7.7 48.0
77 13 4.7 7.01 43.9 7.3 48.8
78 14 4.9 7.31 43.2 7.0 49.9
79 15 5.1 7.65 42.5 6.6 50.9
80 16 5.3 8.03 41.8 6.2 52.0
81 17 5.6 8.47 41.1 5.8 53.1
82 18 5.8 8.98 40.2 5.4 54.4
83 19 6.1 9.58 39.3 5.0 55.7
84 20 6.5 10.29 37.7 4.6 57.8
85 21 6.8 11.15 36.0 4.1 59.9
86 22 7.1 12.20 33.7 3.7 62.7
87 23 7.5 13.52 31.3 3.2 65.5
88 24 7.9 15.23 27.4 2.9 69.7
89 25 8.3 17.53 23.5 2.6 73.9
90 26 8.8 20.74 19.6 2.3 78.1
91 27 9.3 25.59 15.7 1.9 82.4
92 28 9.8 33.79 11.8 1.6 86.6
93 29 10.4 50.35 7.9 1.3 90.8
94 30 11.0 100.00 4.0 1.0 95.0
Note: See Table 11.1 for definitions.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Notes
1 The drawdown methods that these studies recommend are at odds with most
rules that arise from standard economic models of consumption and portfolio
choice; see in particular Sharpe, Scott, and Watson (2008).
2 Recent events in the financial markets coupled with the apparent failure or
inadequacy of the hedging programs employed by some insurers to back these
promises have raised some questions about the viability of these types of products
going forward. Providers are already increasing prices for some of these guaran-
tees.
3 Based on information in the Retirement IncomeData Bankmaintained by Ernst &
Young.
4 Another type of payout fund appears similar to more common ‘income-oriented’
mutual funds, differing only in that the income target for the funds is quantified
and explicitly targeted. Despite the announced target, the level of income and the
periodic payments that the funds will make to shareholders will vary with the
amount of income actually earned by the portfolio, just like a typical mutual fund.
5 Tax considerations may also be important for after-tax investors. Ameriks and
Ren (2008) review these issues and provide some additional simulation analysis
illustrating the impact of taxes.
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